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Strategic Planning for the Protection of U.S.
Technology and Intellectual Property in the Trade
Relationship between the United States and Japan
by Warren G. Shimeall*
F ew Americans are aware of the intensity of the Japanese commit-
ment to development of science and technology. Perhaps nothing
epitomizes that commitment better than Tsukuba Science City. Com-
pleted only recently, it is at least one impressive example of the fact that
"Japan, Inc." is indeed alive and well.
The highly publicized "trade war" between Japan and the United
States, euphemistically represented to be "simmering down" by the Japa-
nese (who characterize their painfully dilatory dismantling of non-tariff
trade barriers as last-straw concessions to an impatient America), now
appears to be escalating.
Recently, the American Ambassador to Japan, former Senator Mike
Mansfield, the highly popular, if not always effective,1 top diplomat at the
U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, was quoted as opining that 1983 loomed as the
year when trade relations will be more critical than at any time
previously.2
Americans, when they bother to reflect on the tenuous U.S.-Japan
trade relationship, tend to experience mixed, often seemingly contradic-
tory, feelings about Japan in the trade context. They are happy with,
even proud of, their Sony TV's, Pioneer Hi-Fi stereos, Honda bikes and
Toyota cars-Japanese products which give long-lasting value to value-
conscious Americans. Yet, there is no denying that Japanese products
have contributed to record unemployment in the United States. 3 Japa-
nese products have displaced U.S.-made products because they have un-
* Partner, Welty, Shimeall & Kasari, Tokyo, Japan; University of Tulsa, George Wash-
ington Univeristy, Oklahoma City University and University of Oklahoma (J.D. 1949).
1 Morse & Olsen, Japan's Bureaucratic Edge, 52 FOREIGN POL'Y 167, 170 (Fall 1983).
2 Commencement Address by Ambassador Mike Mansfield, University of Hawaii, Hon-
olulu (May 15, 1983).
3 Japan Times, Sept. 28, 1983, at 14, col 6. The U.S. trade deficit with Japan will bal-
loon from $16.8 billion in 1982 to an estimated $22 billion in 1983 and $27 billion in 1984,
according to C. Fred Bergsten, a former Treasury Department official who now heads the
Institute for International Economics. Id.
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fettered access to U.S. markets, while at the same time U.S. factory prod-
ucts by the tens of thousands are impeded from similar access and sales
to the affluent Japanese domestic market. Well-dressed Japanese spokes-
men-apologists have borrowed the phrase "try harder" in an effort to de-
flect responsibility for non-tariff barriers onto U.S. business, but the story
of the "fruit cake fiasco" recently suffered by a Texas fruit cake maker is
only too typical of the fate that awaits any U.S. business' effort to enter
the Japanese market.4
Instead of considering the problem at a conceptual and policy level,
the United States succumbed early to the ploy of item by item "study"
and "relaxations of restrictions." 5 While U.S. factories stand idle from
lack of access to Japanese markets, the U.S. government is engrossed in
deliberations concerning metal baseball bats or oranges, and seems unper-
turbed that access for tens of thousands of other manufactured items has
yet to be obtained.6 However, rather than rehash or lament the tactical
skirmishes in the U.S.-Japan trade relationship, which shackled U.S. bus-
iness interests in one era' and amounted to a massive giveaway program
in another,' reevaluation of U.S. policy should be done specifically with
4 When a Corsicana, Texas, maker of gift fruit cakes filled an order from a Japanese
importer who wanted to capitalize on the popularity of this American favorite among Japa-
nese gift givers, no one expected that the Japanese government would bar the shipment of
such an innocuous and non-technical item into Japan. Japanese customs blocked the ship-
ment on an obscure technical ground and rather than pay high custom warehouse storage
charges, the importer donated the fruit cakes to U.S. Navy personnel who could receive
these "dangerous articles" without the need for Japanese customs approval. THE JAPAN
LAWLETrER 58 (March 1983).
5 See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
6 THE JAPAN LAWLETER (Nov.-Dec. 1983).
In the early post-World War II period and continuing into the 1970's, the Japanese
government arbitrarily cut down royalties on U.S. technology imported by Japanese compa-
nies to a 2-3% range in all but exceptional cases even though freely negotiated agreements
by U.S. licensors with Japanese licensees were in the 5-10% royalty range. Although the
practice was commonly known, the U.S. Embassy declined to intervene with the Japanese
government on this practice. U.S. licensors were told to accept the 2% royalty or nothing.
The U.S. government declined to collar the Japanese bureaucracy for a practice that liter-
ally cost U.S. licensors millions in unrecouped research and development expenditures.
AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, JAPAN, INVESTMENT AND LICENSING REPORTS (1961-1966)
reprinted in Bus. INT'L (Jan. 14, 1966, Jan. 21, 1966 and Feb. 4, 1966). See (Japan's) Policy
on Investments from Overseas (U.S.), KEIDANREN REV. 7 (Apr. 1966).
6 During the Korean War (1950-1954), the U.S. Army Procurement Agency (JPA) in
Yokohama engaged in a major effort to introduce U.S. product designs, specifications, and
standards of production and quality assurance in procurements from small, ragtag Japanese
industries. Thousands of product types were introduced to a still dazed and motionless Jap-
anese industrial community, pumping hundreds of millions of dollars and importing price-
less technology, know-how and quality standards all for free (no royalties) to 1930's era
Japanese businesses and industries. JPA's activity was a key factor in Japan's post-World
War II economic recovery-a story that should be written into the history books.
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respect to Japan, focusing on long-range strategic and technological goals.
Richard J. Samuels, Assistant Professor at the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology recently wrote:
Of all the areas in which Westerners can measure our ignorance of Japan
in metric tons, none weighs as heavily as science and technology. Those
foreigners attracted to the study of Japan have until now been predomi-
nantly interested in Japanese art, architecture, literature, martial arts,
religion, and culture, all of which feed upon each other in a Gestalt of
seductive beauty to the Western scholar. Some (but fewer) others have
concentrated upon exploring and explaining Japanese politics and eco-
nomic organization. The study of Japanese science and technology has
inexplicably been a backwater in Western efforts to understand Ja-
pan .... Americans have grown unaccustomed to searching beyond our
borders for technological innovations and scientific discoveries. Not since
the early part of the Twentieth Century have American scientists, engi-
neers and managers assumed that foreign language study and overseas
research collaboration should be an integral part of technical education.
Japan's stunning economic and technological advance has had at least
this one positive effect upon our technological elite. We have been
shaken by the results of our own complacent parochialism. We have be-
gun to develop avenues and expertise that will make the flow of scientific
and technological information between U.S. and Japan more evenly bal-
anced. We have begun to prepare for an era in which much of the world's
technological progress will be multinational in origin and supranational
in benefit."
In a recent lecture at the International House in Tokyo, Mr. Ronald
P. Dore, who is presently with the Technical Change Centre in London,
and author of many books on Japan, said:
Most of us are at least a bit concerned about the position of our
country in the world pecking order, and we all, I think, do tend to as-
sume that there is such a thing as a world pecking order. You can have
standards of excellence for particular fields, France may be particularly
good at oil paintings, the Japanese may have an edge over everybody else
in the management of technology, of productivity advance, the Germans
may be better educators, and so on and so forth. In particular fields there
are individual rankings, but there is also I think a very commonly shared
view around the world that the nations of the world can be put into an
overall ranking order.
But there are differences between countries, first of all, as to where
people place their nation in that rank and order and, secondly, in how
concerned they are about it. One is very conscious of this, of course, as
an Englishman living in a country which has gradually, over the last half
9Letter from Richard J. Samuels to Readers' Forum, 2 ScIrNch AND TECHNOLOGY IN
JPAN 6 (Apr./June 1983).
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century, been very conscious of slipping down the pecking order of na-
tions-especially when one gets involved in troubles like the Falkland
troubles when the British people, who are on the whole pretty confident
that they are still top dogs, are suddenly confronted with a situation in
which whether or not they are top dogs and whether or not they can
assert their will is called into question, and one goes through a momen-
tary national trauma.
For most of us I think the question of who should generally learn
from whom, who is at the top end of the international pecking order in
the position of "teacher" to the world, and who is lower down, is a highly
emotionally fraught subject and not one that can be discussed with an
easy dispassionateness or lack of emotion. That, I think, is why a book
with the title Japan as No. One did so well. To a European, the interest-
ing thing about the enormous popularity of Ezra Vogel's book is the as-
sumption on the part of the Americans that it is part of the order of
nature that America should be No. One, and that if this is not the case, if
Japan has become No. One, then, surely, the times are out of joint and
something ought to be done about it.10
Much is made of the Japanese propensity for settling disputes or
mistakes by consultation and discussion between affected parties. Assum-
ing that this denotes a type of democracy of equals working out a prob-
lem together and that this is the only approach dared taken with Japan
as a trading partner because to do otherwise would foster an imperious
and uncompromising stance literally unknown in Japan, Mr. Dore's fur-
ther remarks should also allay that often repeated misunderstanding:
The quality of Japanese products is often bought at the expense of
subcontractors. I'm astonished in talking to Japanese businessmen at
how frequently one hears the words "guarantee" and "claim"-claim for
compensation against late delivery, failure to maintain quality standards
and whatever-and henpin-goods sent back because they are not up to
standard. The frequency with which these things occur in the Japanese
business world seems to me far greater than anywhere else because of the
insistence on absolute perfection in quality by the people who give sub-
contractors orders.
Because subcontractors are dependent, because they are in the
weaker position, they have to deliver. This means that you're rung up at
two o'clock in the morning by the main firm, by the parent firm, which
says: "Look, we've found 0.05 defects in this latest consignment, you
must send somebody over by tomorrow morning to go through the whole
consignment and take out the defective parts, or we shall have to send
the whole order back," and if you are a dependent subcontractor you say
"Very sorry, yes, yes, I'll be there in an hour."11
10 R. Dore, Reflections on the "Learn from Japan" Boom, 3 IHJ BULL. 1 (Spring 1983).
" Id. at 16.
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The key to understanding this "hard hearted" but common episode
in cultural, ethereal Japan is the Japanese "superior-inferior" relation-
ship. The Japanese insensitivity in business relationships with others who
are in an inferior position is widely known throughout East Asia, espe-
cially Southeast Asia, where the term "economic animal" was coined by
some of Japan's less fortunate trading partners.
While Japan's trade position was inferior vis-&-vis the United States
for nearly the past four decades, Japan was encouraged to maneuver the
United States into using an "equal partner" definition of the U.S.-Japan
trade relationship.12 Though Japan is quite happy to enjoy this gratuitous
"equal partner" status, if it should gain a superior position, the United
States would be accorded, and in some trade sectors is now accorded, an
inferior position by the Japanese, as Japan's Asian neighbors have been
regarded and treated as inferiors.' s If the United States fails to recognize
this ominous evolution, it will surely fall into an inferior trade position
with Japan. The evidence that an ominous evolution is occurring is avail-
able to anyone who desires to assemble and study the statistics and re-
ports on Japan's technological advances. The Japanese government made
a commitment over 10 years ago to achieve technological supremacy in
many critical fields.
Perhaps nothing epitomizes that commitment better than Tsukuba
Science City. Japan planned and constructed an entire new city into
which the research and development facilities for certain critical fields
would be centralized and intensified in an intellectual environment en-
couraging cross-pollination of disciplines. Situated about 40 miles north-
east of Tokyo, the recently completed Tsukuba Science City is a futuris-
tic scientific community of some of the ablest brains in Japan staffing
facilities which include the National Laboratory for High Energy Physics,
the Building Research Institute, the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
Public Corporation, the Public Works Research Institute, the National
Research Centre for Disaster Prevention, the University of Tsukuba, the
Geographic Survey Institute, the Tsukuba Botanical Gardens, the Na-
tional Science Museum, the University of Library and Information Sci-
ence, the Tsukuba Centre for Institutes, the National Research Institute
for Metals, Tsukuba Space Centre (NASDA) and over forty other insti-
tutes, research centers and schools.14 Clearly, Japan's commitment to
technological supremacy is not mere demagoguery by Japanese politicians
seeking office or enhancement of a worldy-wise reputation among
constituents.
12 Yamagata, Outcome of the 4th Japan-U.S. Businessman's Conference, KEiDANREN
REV. 1 (Apr. 1966).
" Unequal are Treaties, TIE JAPAN LAWLEwrER 1 (Nov./Dec. 1983).
14 OFFICE OF THE ProMS MINSTER, TSUKUBA SCIENCE Crry 1981.
1983
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, an avowed Japanese ultranation-
alist, in a statement entitled Leading the Way into the 21st Century,
wrote:
Looking at the history of civilization, we realize that the needs aris-
ing in each new age have the effect of spurring new developments in sci-
ence and technology which, in turn, lead to yet another new age in an
evolution by innovation.
Science and technology development should be pursued with the
spirit of challenging the unknown, within a format of comprehensive,
long-range research and development plans grounded on new perspec-
tives. It will also be necessary to stress a highly creative science and tech-
nology which will contribute to the progress of our international commu-
nity, while keeping the need for a harmonious balance between science
and technology and society.
In view of the spectacular progress that is being achieved in high
technology, especially in the fields of life sciences, electronics, new
materials, and new sources of energy, I believe that progress in these
fields holds the very key to paving the way for a cultural revolution in
the 21st century .... Only under such a system will it be possible for
both advanced and developing countries to make the oncoming 21st cen-
tury an age adorned with new promise for mankind.15
Mr. Nakasone's comments leave little doubt that he intends for Japan to
be leading the world as "top dog" in the "world pecking order" in the
21st Century.
In 1980, the Japanese Patent Office received 191,020 patent applica-
tions, of which 86.8% were filed by Japanese and 5.4% were filed by
Americans." In the same year, the U.S. Patent Office received 104,329
patent applications, of which 40.5% were filed by foreigners, including
12.4% filed by Japanese.1 In a recent year, for every five applications
filed by Americans one Japanese application was filed with the U.S. Pat-
ent Office, "" whereas in Japan, for every sixteen applications fied by Jap-
anese one American application was filed.19 It is not surprising that Ja-
pan's balance of international trade in technology with respect to new
contracts in fiscal year 1980 registered a phenomenal ratio of 2.68 to 1 in
favor of Japan's technology exports over foreign imported technology.20
" Nakasone, Leading the Way into the 21st Century, 2 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN









Japanese are not only filing more patent applications in Japan than
Americans are in the United States, but Japanese are also filing more
applications in the United States than Americans are filing in Japan. Ja-
pan, with approximately half the population of the United States, has
inventors filing nearly 2.5 times as many applications in the two countries
as the United States has."
Though these 1980 figures evidence the vitality of Japan's advances
in science and technology, the following comparison manifests that 1980
was not an unusual year.2 2
2' Yamagata, supra note 12.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGENCY, A SUMMARY OF FY 1980, WHrrE PAPER ON SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY IN JAPN 3 (1981).
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Indices of Comprehensive Power





Notes: 1) -------- in latter half of 1960s:
in latter half of 1970s
2) A: Total added value in manufacturing
B: Number of patents registered
C: Number of patents registered overseas
D: Number of researchers
E: Research expenditure
F: Exports of technology
G: Trade in technology
H: Exports of technology-intensive products
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The United States, in constant terms, shrank in all categories from the
1960's to the 1970's, while Japan expanded in all categories during the
same period.
These statistics do not indicate a lack of patent lawyers, but a lack of
inventors. While issued patents are usually upheld by courts in Japan,
U.S. courts have taken particular delight in emasculating issued patent
rights,23 seeming to ignore the fact that their creation was considered so
important to the founding fathers that they recognized patent rights in
no less a document than the U.S. Constitution: "The Congress shall have
power... to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their re-
spective writings and discoveries." '24
A book entitled The Coming Patent Wars Between Japan and the
United States, just published in Japan, suggests staggering implications
for the United States.2 5 It discusses a possible trade war blueprint for
Japanese economic domination which, to an uncomfortable degree, is no
less foreboding than was the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Plan" in
the 1930's. In discussing the "bottom-line" commercial aspects of a U.S.-
Japan patent war, the book contains various chapters suggesting strate-
gies which Japan must adopt and follow if it is to excel in the high tech-
nology industries over the United States and the rest of the world. The
author of the book has written of Japan's need to attain patent
supremacy in terms unthinkable (or perhaps unprintable) only ten years
ago. While a description of the book as a Mein Kampf of "Japan, the
Economic Animal" is overdrawn, the intense motivation for a grand strat-
egy nevertheless extends far beyond Japan's fragile borders, not totally
unlike a nationalistic plan of a few decades ago.
In 1981 Japan paid $1.71 billion for imported technology while earn-
ing $577 million in exported technology licensed and sold abroad.26 Amer-
icans who take smug pride or summarily dismiss the Japanese technologi-
cal advance should be aware that each year since 1972 Japan has
concluded more export technology contracts than import technology
agreements. For example, in 1981 Japan's technology exports in new con-
tracts exceeded in dollar volume new import technology contracts on the
order of 2.68 to 1.27 As U.S. patents expire and royalties from Japan
cease, the trend established for the past ten years portends a huge rever-
sal in inflow versus outflow of technology. This reversal is indicative of
23 Yamagata, supra note 12.
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25 M. MUJAZAKI, THE COMING PATENT WARs BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES
(1983).
" Import of Foreign Technologies in Japan, supra note 20.
27 Id.
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the U.S. decline in new and high technology inventions issued and li-
censed in Japan as compared to only a few years ago.
Recently, considerable research and study has been conducted into
Japan's non-tariff trade barriers. Mr. David Guttman, former chairman of
the American Chamber of Commerce (ACCJ), in Japan's Patent, License
and Trademark Committee, drafted a report which the ACCJ has
presented to the U.S. government hoping to prompt discussion with the
Japanese government about the unrecognized non-tariff trade barriers
which already are present in the early stage of the so-called U.S.-Japan
Patent War.
28
The Guttman report details a number of Japan Patent Office proce-
dures that tend to make it more difficult for Americans to obtain patents
in Japan (average 6 years) than Japanese in the United States (average 23
months).29 Guttman does point out that Japanese also must wait the
same average 6 years in Japan for a patents3 -so discrimination in that
regard is hard to allege. The unfairness is apparent, however, when a Jap-
anese inventor or company can begin selling or licensing its newly pat-
ented invention in the United States after only 23 months, while the U.S.
inventor must wait for six years to license or sell his Japanese patent in
Japan.
A Statistical Study on the Handling of Foreign Applications by the
Japanese Patent Offices1 provides a current, well-prepared analysis of the
treatment accorded U.S. applications in the Japan Patent Office. As the
table below reveals, in most instances American applicants fare as well as,
if not better than, Japanese applicants in the fields of Semiconductors,
Data Recognition, Telephonic Communication, PPO Plastics and Medical
Electronics.3
2
28 Guttman, Effects of Japanese Intellectual Property Laws on Trade and Investment
in Japan, J. oF THE ACCJ 48 (Nov. 1983).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Helfgott, Statistical Study on the Handling of Foreign Applications by the Japa-
nese Patent Office, PATENTs AND LICENSING (Apr. 1983).
32 Id. at 12.
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The United States can not defend or excuse its decline by claiming
Japanese Patent Office discrimination. The responsibility for decline is
solely that of the United States' offering fewer inventions by fewer inven-
tors. The causes of the decrease have been attributed by numerous au-
thorities to several factors, including disincentives to inventors and inven-
tions, an overemphasis on antitrust and antimonopoly laws by U.S.
government agencies and the courts, short-sighted, immediate-term profit
goals by executives of U.S. business and industry, a shift from emphasis
on education and prestige in the engineering fields to "service" occupa-
tions and finally the lack of a national policy to ensure American leader-
ship in world trade in the 21st century and beyond.
Hopefully, a greater awareness of the goals of the United States'
most formidable trading partner will once again awaken the sleeping
giant.
